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Public Debt Management between Discipline and 
Creativity. Accounting for Energy Performance 
Contracts in Germany 
Lisa Knoll & Konstanze Senge ∗ 
Abstract: »Öffentliches Schuldenmanagement zwischen Disziplin und Kreativität. 
Energie-Einspar-Contracting in Deutschland«. The determination of government 
debt levels is a complex multilayered process subjected to constant reform. In 
the aftermath of the 2007-8 financial crisis, a twofold reform trend has 
emerged. On the one hand, the European Commission demands and supports 
stronger harmonization of national accounts, thereby eliminating loopholes for 
creative accounting practices such as public-private partnerships or swap deals, 
which increase government debt levels in many cases. On the other hand, the 
European Commission demands and supports new forms of ‘creative financing’ 
such as Energy Performance Contracts (EPCs), a specific form of public-private 
partnership designed to meet climate change investment goals. Adopting a lens 
of French Conventionalism, we highlight conflicts within statistic and account-
ing frameworks and their moral-political trajectories. We derive insights into 
these broader conflicts by examining the concrete case of national statistics 
and public sector accounting practices in the German EPC field. 
Keywords: Public-Private Partnerships, public sector accounting, national sta-
tistics, European Stability and Growth Pact, Maastricht Treaty, fiscal discipline, 
creative financing, conventions of quantification. 
1.   Introduction 
Government debt levels are important indicators under the European Maas-
tricht regime installed to ensure fiscal discipline among the European Member 
States. In the aftermath of the 2007-8 financial crisis, this regime became un-
stable. It became obvious that states had been using many practices to hide 
their real debt and deficit levels with the help of professional public-private co-
financing arrangements (Benito et al. 2008; Morales et al. 2014). Today, the 
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European Union and its most important institutions – the European Central 
Bank, the statistical office of the European Union Eurostat, and the European 
Commission – are seeking solutions and instruments to reinstate fiscal disci-
pline in the era of prolonged government bond purchasing programs and foster 
economic growth by stimulating real economy investments. This is a compli-
cated task under the condition of the European consolidation state (Streeck 
2015), which renders government investment programs difficult, even though 
money is cheap in the bond markets due to the European Central Bank’s pur-
chasing program.  
In this article, we analyze the ambivalent consequences for public sector ac-
counting of this paradoxical situation which demands real economy invest-
ments and fiscal discipline. We observe a need for greater accuracy and inter-
national harmonization of national statistics regulated by the European system 
of national and regional accounts (ESA) on the one hand, and a growing de-
mand for flexible and ‘creative’ public-private co-financing arrangements on 
the other hand, which enable the public sector to engage in off-balance sheet 
accounting following the rationality of the International Public Sector Account-
ing Standards (IPSAS). In this context, a range of new practices emerges, to 
optimize public sector accounts that render it increasingly difficult to distin-
guish between public and private investments; yet, this unbundling is necessary 
to determine objective public debt and deficit levels under the Maastricht re-
gime regulated by ESA. In the course of New Public Management reforms, 
many public administrations implemented accounting rules as suggested by the 
IPSAS (Adhikari and Gårseth-Nesbakk 2016). These reforms allowed public 
administrations to consider the market values of their properties and to under-
stand them as sellable and manageable risks (Eyraud 2016). This development 
gave rise to huge array of public-private mixed investment forms that promise 
rational risk transfer options between the public and the private sector (e.g. 
Jupe 2012). Public-private partnerships (PPPs) and their liability structures 
render public sector debt and deficit levels manageable. In the UK, a rather 
extreme example, the interplay between European National Statistics and Inter-
national Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) for private companies allowed 
off-off-balance sheet investments, which led to PPPs that appeared neither on 
the accounts of the public purchasers, nor on the financial statements of the 
operators (Heald 2011, 227). These creative accounting practices are possible, 
because the IFRS, IPSAS, and ESA frameworks have little overlap. What is 
accounted for in Eurostat’s National Statistics under the Stability and Growth 
Pact does not necessarily correspond to the financial statements of public sector 
entities, especially when they become more heterogeneous over the course of 
an ongoing reform process (Heald and Georgiou 2011; Adhikari and Gårseth-
Nesbakk 2016). In Germany, the situation is unique in the sense that the Euro-
pean system of national and regional accounts (ESA) and the German “Schul-
denbremse” (brake on debt) are based upon different systems. The national 
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Schuldenbremse is based on cameralistic and cash-based accounting which 
does not focus future liabilities and related risks (Schmid 2007, 111-3). Here, 
PPPs are attractive financing tools, since they align with a buy now, pay later 
attitude. Under the European Maastricht criteria, PPPs are evaluated as deals 
which sell future public risks to private parties. If the statistical officials con-
clude that this is not the case, they become to be accounted for as public sector 
investments. Thus, public sector accounting and national statistical frameworks 
need to be understood as constructive vehicles by which public investments 
under budgetary constraints can be managed positively, depending on the insti-
tutional frameworks and trajectories of different countries. It may also be de-
duced that this flexibility is necessary under a regime of strict budgetary con-
straints, which would otherwise allow much less public sector investment 
activity.  
We analyze these contradictory public sector accounting trends (discipline 
and creativity) by digging into the specific case of Energy Performance Con-
tracts (EPCs) in the German context. EPCs are specific PPP-like co-financing 
arrangements designed to sell the performance risk of an energy efficiency 
investment to a private party. The energy service company guarantees energy 
savings by which the investment can later be refinanced. The private party 
receives a return on its investment only after the a priori monetized perfor-
mance target is achieved. EPCs have existed since the early 1990s, but their 
treatment in public sector accounts has been changing in the wake of current 
European and German public sector reforms. By recapitulating the various 
budgetary treatments of EPCs in Germany, we identify a conflict within the 
public sector accounting world between a more distant accounting practice 
aimed at trying to identify risks in a conservative and neutral manner, and a 
more hands-on accounting practice focused on the details of individual con-
tracts to enable individual risk assessment. PPPs more generally, and EPCs in 
particular, require individual risk assessment to determine whether they will 
affect government accounts or can be recorded off government balance sheets. 
In this respect, accounting frameworks and their interpretations of risk can vary 
greatly within Germany.  
We analyze these conflicts from the perspective of French Conventionalism, 
which argues that state statistics and public sector accounting reveal the histor-
ical political trajectories and political philosophies of how to manage a ‘good’ 
economy (Desrosières 2003). Our case shows how the philosophies enshrined 
in quantitative devices can be interpreted differently at the local level (Eyraud 
2016). Our study displays conflicts in the treatment of EPCs in government 
accounts and in national statistics in Germany. The argument is structured as 
follows: First, we describe the general contradictions concerning PPP account-
ing in the context of the European crisis with a special focus on EPCs. Second, 
we present our analytical perspective of conventions of quantification in the 
tradition of Alain Desrosières. Third, we apply our analytical framework to 
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examine disputes in the German accounting context, with a specific focus on 
the treatment of EPCs. We end with a conclusion on the difference between a 
liberal and a neoliberal statistical convention and their specific ways of deter-
mining and controlling risk. 
2.  Accounting Frameworks under Reform 
The European system of national and regional accounts (ESA), the instrument 
used to control and monitor the European Stability and Growth Pact, has been 
subject to continuous reform since it was first published in 1970. It was devel-
oped from the Keynesian international System of National Accounts (SNA) 
established after the Second World War, and it was reformed in the course of 
European monetary integration. ESA 1995 (enforced in 2002) was considered 
necessary to provide “harmonised and reliable statistics” in order to “achieve 
the objectives set by the Treaty on European Union, and more specifically 
Economic and Monetary Union” as stated in the introduction (ESA 1995, 1). 
What was considered especially necessary was the harmonization of the gross 
national product (GNP) to define the national debt and deficit levels, as com-
mitted to in the Treaty of the Monetary Union. The Maastricht Treaty signed by 
Member States in 1992 demanded the harmonization of national data gathering 
and production processes, since one of the obligations of the treaty is to provide 
“sound public finances and monetary conditions” (Article 3a), with debt lim-
ited to 60 percent of GDP and annual deficits no greater than 3 percent of GDP. 
Furthermore, the treaty prohibits Member States borrowing from national or 
European central banks (Article 104), and the Lisbon Treaty enforced in 2009 
prohibits solidarity between Member States in cases of default (Article 135). 
European Member States are obliged to obtain financing from private banks to 
ensure exposure to the mechanism of market discipline. These regulations are 
intended to impose an indirect European control mechanism, which is accom-
panied by direct control mechanisms of statistical control and regular publica-
tion of debt and deficit levels. The 2007-8 financial and fiscal crisis again 
spawned a need for reforms and led to significant expansion of the ESA 
framework. ESA 1979 (a revised version of ESA 1970) has 238 pages, ESA 
1995 (enforced in 2002) has 420 pages and ESA 2010 (enforced in 2014) has 
634 pages. These enlargements are not merely technical, but driven by political 
and socio-economic constellations that need to be understood.  
We claim these enlargements have to do with a twofold trend of more disci-
pline and more creativity in public sector financial accounting. In response to 
the financial and fiscal crisis, European accounting rules have been reformed to 
prevent legal loopholes for the “creative accounting” practices necessitated by 
“creative financing” techniques such as using PPPs as vehicles to hide public 
investments (Benito et al. 2008), or the more famous (and tragic) case of 
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Greece, where public debt levels were sold to a private bank via a clandestine 
currency swap to enable Greece to meet the Maastricht criteria (Morales et al. 
2014). Later, this deal became incredibly expensive to the Greek and the Euro-
pean taxpayers.1 One reaction to the financial and fiscal crisis thus was the 
strengthening of statistical data. At the international level, the G-20 Data Gaps 
Initiative was launched in 2009;2 and at the European level the ESA 2010 re-
forms were aimed at harmonizing the determination of public debt and deficit 
levels in the post-crisis era. ESA 2010 “has 11 new chapters…which reflect 
developments in measuring modern economies” (Article 1.02). It deals with 
new topics such as “wider coverage of financial derivative contracts,” “finan-
cial corporations in general, and special purpose entities (SPEs) in particular,” 
the “treatment of government controlled SPEs abroad,” “the treatment of super 
dividends paid by public corporations,” and “principles for the treatment of 
public-private partnerships.” Furthermore, to ensure the quality and compara-
bility of European statistics, the European Statistics Code of Practice was pub-
lished in 2011. It defines 15 principles for European statisticians, among them 
the principles of “impartiality and objectivity,” “scientific independence,” 
“coherence,” and “accuracy and reliability” (Eurostat 2011). It underlines a 
scientific statistical impetus backing the professional identity of national ac-
countants as independent from political influence and rooted in scientific objec-
tivity. One can say that the ESA reforms are in part a reaction to the fact that 
public-private co-financing arrangements have been used by national govern-
ments to “optimize” their debt and deficit levels in a fraudulent manner.  
On the other hand, sophisticated financing vehicles like operating leases, 
PPPs, and concessions have always been used to maintain public investment 
levels in times of budget discipline. It is widely acknowledged among experts 
that off-government balance sheet options are the most important drivers of 
privatization and different types of public-private co-financing arrangements. 
Even though they promise efficiency and private sector effectiveness, PPP 
arrangements are more expensive than public direct investments (Vining et al. 
2005; Bel and Warner 2008). This fact is widely acknowledged within the 
field: “The pivotal point of concern and criticism of PPPs is their cost of funds, 
which is typically higher than the cost of public funds” (Blanc‐Brude and 
Strange 2007, 93-4). Thus, there must be other reasons for their broad usage, 
                                                             
1  The scandalous creative co-financing arrangement in Greece, a swap deal with Goldman 
Sachs to hide public sector debt and deficit levels to enter the European Union (Morales et 
al. 2014), is not an exception in institutional terms. It may be an exception in terms of its 
historical consequences. 
2  After the global financial crisis, the G-20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors 
issued 20 recommendations to address data gaps. The Financial Stability Board (FSB) and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) supported this endeavour. The Inter-Agency Group on 
Economic and Financial Statistics (IAG) coordinates and supervises the application of rec-
ommendations (<http://www.imf.org/external/np/seminars/eng/dgi/index.htm>).  
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and off-government balance sheet solutions are attractive solutions for public 
sector entities (Mühlenkamp 2014). When it comes to PPPs, the ESA frame-
work is based on a risk and reward logic to determine the question of owner-
ship. According to the rule of “economic substance over legal form” (ESA 
2010 1.90 and 20.164), ownership is not defined by the legal form of a compa-
ny or the special purpose vehicle. Since an asset can either be public or private, 
but not both, the entire PPP needs to be identified as a public or a private sector 
investment (EPEC et al. 2016, 15). The criterion is whether risks and rewards 
are transferred to a private unit. The risk assessment is based on three main 
categories of risk: “construction risk”: covering events like late delivery, re-
spect of specifications and increased costs; “availability risk”: covering the 
volume and the quality of output (linked to the performance of the partner); 
“demand risk”: covering the variability of demand (the effective use of the 
asset by end-users). (Eurostat 2016, 333)  
If the private party bears the construction risk and at least one of the other 
risks (availability or demand), then PPP related assets should be classified off 
the government’s balance sheet. Some have argued that this is a weak criterion 
that can be easily met (Heald 2011, 241). Eurostat, together with the European 
PPP Expertise Centre (EPEC) and the European Investment Bank recommend 
an “early consultation with national statistical authorities … if the statistical 
treatment of a project is likely to be a determining factor in the public sector’s 
decision to procure or enter into a PPP contract” (EPEC et al. 2016, 12). This 
shows the importance of political will and assistance to define off-government 
balance sheet solutions.  
The German Statistical Office (Destatis), generally, adopts a more transpar-
ency-oriented attitude toward the notion of risk transfer in public-private co-
financing arrangements. For example, it went for an exceptional solution on the 
question of how to account for the German “bad banks” under the Stability and 
Growth Pact regime. It argued for an on-government balance sheet solution, 
which was highly debated at the time (Gandrud and Hallerberg 2014).3 This 
shows that the notion of risk transfer is open to various interpretations, and the 
ESA framework and Eurostat determine the scope for decision-making among 
the Member States’ institutions. We argue that this room for interpretation 
emerges from a tension between the requirement for financial discipline on the 
one hand, and the requirement for financial creativity on the other hand. On the 
one hand, public sector accounting is tied to the rule of “impartiality” (i.e., 
                                                             
3  Gandrud and Hallerberg (2014, 10) write: “The German bad banks were ultimately classified 
as being in the public sector and not contingent liabilities because of the public ownership 
of the institutions that they were restructuring. … Clearly the government preferred that 
the AMCs [asset managed companies] should not increase the public debt. It was Eurostat’s 
decision and subsequent enforcement in conjunction with the German statistical agency –
Destatis – that forced this change”.  
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apolitical evaluation) and “objective” assessment of “real” public expenditure 
directed against any form of manipulation of public accounts. Government 
statistics fulfill the duty of external monitoring and control. On the other hand, 
public sector accounting must identify opportunities to transfer risks via off-
government balance sheet solutions to allow public expenditures under budget-
ary constraints. Here, government statistics play an involved, active and ena-
bling role for public investments. We claim that concrete public sector account-
ing solutions meander between these two poles.  
This general conflict is evident in the case of Energy Performance Contracts 
(EPCs), which have become an important investment vehicle for the European 
Commission to achieve its climate change goals. The EU Directive 2012/27/EC 
on energy end-use efficiency and energy services explicitly demands the re-
moval of regulatory and non-regulatory barriers to promote EPCs. It states:  
There is a need to identify and remove regulatory and non-regulatory barriers 
to the use of energy performance contracting and other third-party financing 
arrangements for energy savings. These barriers include accounting rules and 
practices that prevent capital investments and annual financial savings result-
ing from energy efficiency improvement measures from being adequately re-
flected in the accounts for the whole life of the investment. (Art. 48) 
Eurostat reacted to this requirement by reforming its guideline for EPC treat-
ment in government accounts. In 2015, Eurostat released the mandatory Guid-
ance Note, “The Impact of Energy Performance Contract on Government Ac-
counts,” and shortly thereafter in 2017, replaced it with a new version because 
“the criteria established in the 2015 guidance note for an operating lease treat-
ment were considered too strict” (Guidance Note 2017, Article 1.4) and viewed 
as an obstacle to public energy efficiency investments. The recently published 
report by the EU High-Level Expert Group on Sustainable Finance expresses 
the hope that this new legislation “opens the way for billions of new invest-
ments to make European buildings more energy efficient” (EU High-Level 
Expert Group on Sustainable Finance, 2018, 60), and promotes EPCs as a 
specific “form of ‘creative financing’ for capital improvement” in the public 
sector.4 EPCs are designed to sell the performance risk of an energy efficiency 
investment to a private energy service company that guarantees a certain prede-
fined reduction target, which translates into future public savings. This contrac-
tual set-up builds upon what Jens Beckert (2016) calls “imagined futures,” and 
uses financialized concepts of risk and return to structure public investments 
(Chiapello 2015). It also makes EPCs attractive for public decision makers and 
organizations that need to meet the Maastricht criteria (Polzin et al. 2016).  
                                                             
4  See <https://e3p.jrc.ec.europa.eu/articles/energy-performance-contracting>, last access 
2018-03-27. 
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Before digging into the German EPC case, we outline our analytical per-
spective on the interplay between statistical and quantitative forms of govern-
ance and the historical-political philosophies that explain them.  
3.  Conventions of Quantification 
Historical transformations of accounting rules are surrounded by an aura of 
technicality and often are presented as processes of “inevitable and univocal 
progress” (Desrosières 2003, 553). This neutral presentation is astonishing, 
given the variety of accounting systems that have been in place throughout the 
history of mankind (Graeber 2009). Investigating historical accounting systems 
brings to the fore the diverse political ideologies inscribed in them. For exam-
ple, the communist system of national accounts (MPS) was based on the as-
sumption that products (not services) are the main carriers of economic value, 
which led to the (ironic) consequence that in  
Cuba, where health and education services (and plan administration) have 
grown much more rapidly than output of goods, the growth rate is slower on 
the MPS national income concept than on a ‘bourgeois’ one! (Seers 1976, 
194) 
This example underlines the necessity of analyzing accounting systems in their 
historical and political contexts.  
Following Eve Chiapello and Christian Walter (2016, 156), we adopted a 
conventionalist approach which assumes “that quantification systems have a 
history, and that it is possible to sketch out that history by identifying some 
major turning points in the conception of the phenomena we seek to model and 
understand.” (See also Diaz-Bone and Didier 2016) This means that monitoring 
systems – including accounting systems such as the International Financial 
Reporting Standards (Chiapello 2016, 2017) on which the International Public 
Sector Accounting Standards are based (Adhikari and Gårseth-Nesbakk 2016) 
– cannot be studied independently from more general notions of a fair econo-
my. This analytical line is rooted in the work of Alain Desrosières (1998), who 
emphasizes the interconnectedness of the economy, the state, and statistics 
(Desrosières 2003, 2011). Table 1 illustrates this interconnectedness using the 
examples of the engineer state, the Keynesian state, the liberal state, and the 
neoliberal state. 
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Table 1: The State, the Market, and Statistics  
State Conceptualization of Society and Economy Mode of Action Forms of Statistics 
Engineer state 
(since the 17th 
century) 
Hierarchically struc-
tured institutions; 
rationally organized; 
France, from Colbert 
to De Gaulle; USSR 
Optimization under 
constraints; reduction 
of costs; planning; 
technocracy; major 
work projects; long 
term vision 
Demography; pro-
duction in physical 
quantity; input-
output table; mate-
rial balance 
Keynesian state 
(since the 1940s) 
Market cannot func-
tion on its own with-
out generating crises; 
market must be 
regulated at a global 
level 
Supervising and 
managing occasional 
gaps between global 
supply and demand 
through monetary 
and budgetary policies 
National accounting; 
analysis of the 
economic situation; 
economic budgets 
Liberal state 
(since the 18th 
century) 
Physiocracy; an 
extensive market;  
free competition 
Fight against corpo-
ratism; free-trade 
philosophy; anti-trust 
laws protecting 
competition 
Statistics promoting 
market transparency; 
measurement of 
possible dominant 
position; market 
share 
Neoliberal state 
(since the 1990s) 
An extensive market; 
free and undistorted 
competition; 
financialization; 
central decision-
making 
functions distributed 
to networks 
Moving from rights 
to incentives; turning 
administrations 
into agencies; con-
tractualization 
 
Objectification of 
new areas of equiva-
lence; construction 
and use of indicators 
to evaluate and 
classify performance; 
benchmarking 
supplements or 
replaces directives 
and regulations 
Source: Desrosières 2011, 45, reduced version of the original table. 
 
The planned economy of the engineer state typically requires input-output 
tables, which are not necessarily monetary; the state must understand the flows 
of industrial materials and food before it can intervene and manage production 
and consumption. Keynesian national statistics were designed to monitor such 
macroeconomic developments. In a Keynesian state, it is important to analyze 
booms and recessions to be able to intervene when necessary:  
the 1929 crisis not only induced the ‘Keynesian revolution’ but also the com-
plex apparatus of National Accounts, a form of action on which so-called 
‘Keynesian policies’ are based (Desrosières 2011, 78).  
A crucial development associated with the Keynesian perspective was the 
conceptualization of the economy as a whole (Desrosières 2003, 560). In a 
liberal state, statistics are focused on securing and guaranteeing exchange and 
price mechanisms.  
Thus, in contrast to purely theoretical liberalism, ‘real’ liberalism implied for 
the state a role as organ of economic intelligence, gathering and disseminating 
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information needed by economic agents in order to act in the market (ibid., 
557). 
The statistics of the liberal state “aim at bringing the real markets into conso-
nance with theory: complete and identical information for all stakeholders, 
especially in the matter of prices” (Desrosières 2011, 44). But the idea of eco-
nomic intervention is an anathema to liberals who believe in the free market 
and a laissez-faire approach. Liberal beliefs are at odds with the use of statistics 
as a tool of a planning and intervening central state, even one that operates in 
the name of liberalism. It is noteworthy that both “Ronald Reagan and Marga-
ret Thatcher…cut funding for official statistics in the name of reducing state 
direction of the economy” (Desrosières 2003, 561). Statistics and its calculative 
centers have changed in the neoliberal era. Statistics are not produced to under-
stand macro societal constellations, but to reveal microeconomic dynamics 
based on the main hypotheses of rational expectations theory, which became an 
important paradigm in the 1980s (Desrosières 2011, 46). Thus, statistics are 
produced to establish incentive structures and benchmarking systems that ena-
ble the performance measurement and comparison of economic agents (ibid.). 
Desrosières highlights how  
microeconometric models of logistic regression make it possible to separate 
and to isolate the ‘specific effects’ of variables or tools used in public activi-
ties affecting their performance, and thus to improve the ‘target variables’ of 
policies which are conceived in terms of incentives (especially fiscal) and of 
the behavior of individuals. (ibid.)  
Post-crisis reform efforts can be viewed as a process aimed at strengthening the 
liberal regime of market discipline. The European debt and deficit statistics 
under the Stability and Growth Pact are designed (among other aims) to allow 
markets to exercise disciplinary power over the fiscal performance of states.5 
Parts of the latest reforms aim at strengthening fiscal transparency in line with 
a liberal convention of quantification. At the international level of the G-20 
Data Gaps Initiative, we may also observe initiatives to regain Keynesian mac-
roeconomic oversight of recurring financial crises and global financial insta-
bilities (Wagner 2016). The reforms from cash accounting to accrual account-
ing fostered by the International Public Sector Accounting Standards (IPSAS), 
which are the blueprint for quite different public sector accounting reforms at 
the national and regional levels in OECD countries (Adhikari and Gårseth-
Nesbakk 2016), represent a different type of quantitative governance tool. The 
standards were designed to foster an entrepreneurial management perspective 
in public sector financial accounting. Public administrations are turned into 
agencies by an accounting standard that helps them identify future management 
                                                             
5  The crisis of the Maastricht regime has to do with the fact that government bond markets 
did not believe in it, which is shown by the declining yield curve of Greek government 
bonds in the moment Greece entered the Euro zone (Streeck 2013). 
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risks. As Stark (2002, 137) pointed out, New Public Management reforms 
consist of an array of devices beyond accounting reforms, including: 
- Competition between public and private service providers; 
- decentralization and delayering of government bureaus; 
- benchmarking and output measurements; 
- performance contracts and other financial incentives for public servants; 
- the creation of internal markets; and 
- private-sector management techniques, including better risk management 
practices.  
Accrual accounting supports New Public Management reforms since it informs 
public managers about their financial options. The value-for-money logic helps 
reveal whether you should “stay in your buildings, or sell them, or rent them 
out, and go and rent or buy where it’s cheaper” as described by a public man-
ager during an interview with Corine Eyraud (2016, 183). As Eyraud points 
out, the value-for-money logic is attractive to state officials, since states be-
come richer by assigning a monetary value to their properties. It helps them “to 
relativize public indebtedness by comparing it with the assets, showing that 
there are not only debts but also public wealth” (Eyraud 2016, 185). However, 
accrual accounting also provides an opportunity to understand the economy as 
a microeconomic problem addressed only through private contracts if and when 
states view themselves as deal-making entrepreneurs. EPCs are a specific artic-
ulation of this trend.  
4.  Energy Performance Contracts in Germany  
We now analyze EPCs as a specific case revealing the broader trend of public 
debt management between discipline and creativity. We interviewed experts in 
the German EPC field who worked for: energy agencies from different federal 
states (Bundesländer); promotional banks at the Länder level; administrative 
authorities responsible for energy efficiency investments; the German Energy 
Agency (Dena), which organizes a dialog between the national government and 
the federal states on how to remove administrative and legal barriers for EPCs; 
and the German Federal Statistical Office (Destatis), where the Maastricht data 
are produced and the European EPC accounting reform is to be implemented.  
We begin this section with a brief introduction to the German EPC market. 
EPCs were first implemented as part of the U.S. Energy Policy Act of 1992 and 
they have been well established in Germany since the 1990s (Seefeldt 2003, 
1013). According to a market report, 96 EPC projects were launched between 
2006 and 2015 in Germany (Hermann and Plüschke 2016, 18). In 2014, the 
turnover realized by energy service companies actively operating in the Ger-
man market (e.g., Siemens, EnBW, Bilfinger, RWE) was 79.55 million Euro 
(ibid.). An EPC is an agreement between a public administration that owns 
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public buildings (e.g., museums, schools, universities, indoor swimming pools) 
and an energy service company that guarantees a quantified reduction in energy 
consumption levels achieved by investments in energy efficiency measures 
over a defined period of time. The identified public savings are to be used to 
finance the investment. The public building owner only needs to pay after 
guaranteed energy saving levels are achieved. Today, model contracts are 
provided by the Federal Office for Economic Affairs and Export Control 
(Bafa), which help develop business models based on energy savings goals, 
savings guarantees, pay-back modalities, and measurement methods for energy 
consumption and efficiency gains.6  
The first EPCs in Germany were implemented based on a monetary savings 
argument. The federal state Berlin pioneered the EPC in Germany and imple-
mented it as a specific solution especially attractive for local governments 
under budgetary constraints. The Federal Budget Law (Bundeshaushaltsgesetz) 
severely restricted the establishment of EPCs, and Berlin found solutions to 
overcome them. After successful pilot projects by the Berlin Committee on 
Budgets (Hauptausschuss des Abgeordnetenhauses von Berlin), an order was 
released that future EPCs would not have to be treated as credit-like liabilities 
(kreditähnliches Rechtsgeschäft), and thus would not affect the credit limit of 
the Berlin budget. What is still necessary is a profitability verification com-
pared to standard public purchasing (Nachweis der Wirtschaftlichkeit 
gegenüber Eigenbesorgung). Furthermore, Berlin introduced a new budgetary 
position allowing accounting for “savings,” which are offset against the EPC’s 
yearly or monthly contracting rate. In that way, the individually contracted 
saving metrics become an integral part of the public sector financial statement.7 
The following table demonstrates the wide variety of EPC treatments by the 
German federal states. Since 2015, the Bund-Länder-Dialog Contracting fi-
nanced by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy has 
aimed to define the regulatory obstacles faced by EPCs in Germany. To do so, 
it published the great level of heterogeneity of public sector accounting solu-
tions applied in Germany. Thus, Table 2 does not indicate that all Länder have 
EPCs; rather, it indicates the differences of legal frameworks governing their 
potential establishment.  
  
                                                             
6 <http://www.bafa.de/BfEE/DE/Energiedienstleistungen/Contracting/Mustervertraege/muster 
vertraege_node.html, accessed August 30, 2018. 
7  This information is derived from interviews with representatives of the Energy Agency of 
Berlin, Environmental Agency of the federal state Berlin, and the German Energy Agency 
(Dena). 
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Table 2: EPC Accounting Solutions by the German Federal States 
EPC BB BE BW BY HB HE HH MV NI NW RP SH ST SN SL TH 
Credit-like 
liability under 
provision of the 
Federal Budget 
Law 
X  X (X)    X X X X X X  (X) X 
Effect on  
credit limit X  X (X)   X  (X) X X X X  (X) (X) 
Profitability 
verification 
compared to 
other forms of 
financing 
X X X X 
m
iss
in
g 
ite
m
 
X X X (X) X X X X  X X 
Forfeiting/ 
forfeiting 
without waivers 
of objections 
(wo) 
X (X) (X) (X) X X X (X) X (X)
X 
w
o 
X 
w
o 
(X)
m
iss
in
g 
ite
m
 
(X) X 
Public sector 
accounting 
(1: Enhanced 
cameralistic; 2: 
accrual) 
1 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Source: Own composition; data from Dena Deutsche Energy Agentur/Kompetenzzentrum 
Contracting,<https://www.kompetenzzentrum-contracting.de/umsetzungshilfen/gesetze-
bestimmungen/laenderregelungen-haushaltsrecht> (Accessed July 30, 2018) & <https://www. 
haushaltssteuerung.de/haushaltsreform-deutschland.html> (Accessed August 30, 2018); (X) = 
individual assessment. 
 
The interviews reveal that profitability verification (Wirtschaftlich-
keitsprüfung) and their treatment as credit-like liabilities (kreditähnliches 
Rechtsgeschäft) are important obstacles preventing EPC contracts to be signed 
at the level of the federal states. The profitability verification requires a proof 
for PPPs being more efficient than alternative public funding vehicles. This 
evidence is difficult to prove, since PPPs often show to be expensive in the 
long-run. Furthermore, the status as a credit-like liability jeopardizes off-
balance sheet solutions. It is tied to the logic of budgetary discipline and con-
trol defined by the Federal Budget Law. Also relevant is the different treatment 
of forfeiting in the different federal states. Forfeiting (or factoring) enables the 
“long-term sale of (future) receivables” from an energy service company to a 
bank (Hermann and Plüschke 2016, 37) in order to obtain better credit terms 
stemming from better risk evaluations of public sector investments by rating 
agencies. EPCs thus are more likely to be established when the state allows 
forfeiting. Forfeiting is an instrument by which monetary flows (i.e., contract-
ing rates) are passed directly to a bank on a regular and guaranteed basis. For 
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banks, these kinds of secured revenue streams are important, since they in-
crease their leverage in financial markets. Interestingly, the federal states 
Schleswig-Holstein and Rhineland-Palatinate added a certain condition to their 
forfeiting instrument. They do not allow waivers of objections (Einredever-
zicht), which would impede the state from withdrawing from projects and 
withholding payments if problems arise. Waivers of objections are especially 
delicate, since EPCs are structures in which problems can easily occur and 
renegotiations during projects are quite common.  
The difficulty lies in linking financial reimbursement rates to energy effi-
ciency gains throughout a project’s duration. This commodification process is a 
result of complex negotiations between the energy service company and the 
public sector building owner. The decisive element of the performance measure 
is the time period for which performance is guaranteed and the risk assumed by 
the investor. A Siemens engineer responsible for developing EPCs explained in 
a publicly available video: 
Nobody is really able to predict what electricity costs are gonna be in 3 years. 
Most contracts are 10 to 15 years in nature, so it’s critically important to base 
the savings on units and then dollarize those, into either current rates or rea-
sonable rates.8 
This contractual reimbursement relationship is jeopardized by unforeseen 
changes in energy use, for example, when a new class of users causes an in-
crease in energy consumption that was unforeseen and thus not contracted 
beforehand. Adjustments become necessary, for example, when the building is 
used by a different class of people. An EPC webinar mentions that women get 
cold more easily than men, which leads to increased heating costs if more 
women use the building. This unforeseen change would not be part of the per-
formance risk assumed by the private contractor and would make renegotia-
tions necessary.9 When not contracted beforehand, these changes can create 
conflicts between the public owner and the investor in terms of the savings 
guaranteed and the risk assumed by the investor. To avoid conflict, definitions 
must be established before a contract goes into effect – that is, who will meas-
ure what, when and how, and what types of changes require meetings to adjust 
performance metrics. When asked during an interview about the most im-
portant risks associated with establishing an EPC, one expert responded: “In 
my view, the planning risk is the most important. If mistakes are made in the 
beginning, nothing will be achieved afterwards.” This quote underlines the 
                                                             
8  Case Study: Energy Savings Performance Contracts, published online 13.10.2010 at 
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HGlkVXOy0PIyou> (Accessed March 27, 2018). 
9  Webinar available online at <http://guarantee-project.eu/knowledgebase>, last accessed 
2018-03-27. GuarantEE is a project funded by the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research 
and innovation program, coordinated by the Berliner Energieagentur, conducted by consor-
tium partners from 14 European countries. 
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fragile nature of contract terms ranging from tools of measurement, to 
timeframes, to financing modalities and reasonable pay-back rates over a de-
fined period of time.  
Another interesting aspect of the German context is how EPCs are treated 
by the German Statistical Office responsible for producing the Maastricht data 
under the European System of National and Regional Accounts (ESA). Ac-
cording to our interviewee at Destatis, EPCs are treated with caution and sensi-
tivity to risk. Here, risk is not defined by an individual contract logic, but by a 
general macroeconomic logic which views PPP arrangements in general (and 
EPCs in particular) as public sector investments. Thus, no matter what kind of 
risk allocation model is applied to an individual EPC, the effect on the national 
account appears on the public sector balance sheet. From the expert’s perspec-
tive, this is also a question of impartiality of official statistics, which should not 
be interfered with or distorted politically. Moreover, our interviewee mentions 
the question of manpower. Individual contract assessments to evaluate whether 
risks are really transferred, is just not feasible or doable within the time and 
manpower available. Thus, contract assessment is based on a more generalized 
approach that does not go into the details of individual contracts. This pragmat-
ic and cautious approach is aligned with a professional ethos of scientific de-
tachment and neutrality that official statistics should not be influenced by polit-
ical interests, but transparent and impartial. This is, of course, disregarded by 
EPC advocates and Eurostat, which modified its 2015 Guidance Note just two 
years later specifically because a new way of assessing EPCs was politically 
desirable. The expert we interviewed viewed this as problematic: 
This is the handbook about deficits and department levels. [Shows the hand-
book, Eurostat 2016] If you have 25 chapters that contradict each other, you 
make yourself unreliable sooner or later. There is a certain need to act in a co-
herent manner. But the political pressure must be very high with these strange 
energy performance contracts, so they start inventing absurd new things.  
One “new thing” that has been invented, according to our interviewee, is the 
buy and leaseback model. The Guidance Note 2017 clarifies:  
if an EPC-contractor is bearing the majority of the risks and rewards associat-
ed with the use of an asset, the EPC-contractor shall be regarded as the eco-
nomic owner of this asset; in the case above, EPCs can either be accounted for 
by using the operating lease treatment or the buy and leaseback model.  
Up to now, this individual contract assessing practice is not applied in the 
German Maastricht accounts. This indicates a conflict within the public sector 
accounting world upon the question if official statisticians and accountants 
should take over the individual contract rationality or if they should take over 
an external and impartial stance towards the economic activities of the state. 
Our case reveals the existence of a conflicted transformation process whereby 
accountants – whether at the European, national or federal state level – find 
diverse accounting solutions. This is in line with Eyraud’s (2016) argument for 
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the importance of investigating not only the abstract political philosophies of 
accounting devices, but also the multiple ways they are used and interpreted in 
practice. 
5.  Conclusion: Diverse Risk Practices 
Our case reveals the existence of diverse approaches to risk in accounting and 
public sector finance in the context of the European Consolidation State. On 
the one hand we find a notion of budgetary discipline and the risk of public 
sector spending, and on the other hand we identify a requirement for creative 
co-financing arrangements with individually contracted risk sharing models. 
The treatment of PPPs in public accounts reflects this political duality. The 
binary logic of either public or private sector classifications in European na-
tional accounts is one that becomes more difficult as the economic assets to be 
classified become more complex and risk assessments must be determined on a 
case-by-case basis.  
One solution to this problem is the rather distant approach to risk assessment 
applied by the German Statistical Office (Destatis) under the Maastricht re-
gime. Since it is difficult to assess the future risk of co-financed investments, 
the rationale here is to generally account for them as public investments and to 
assess individual contracts only in exceptional cases. We also find this caution-
ary position in some of the German federal states, which treat PPPs in a rather 
conservative way as credit-like liabilities with strict profitability verification 
tests in place. PPPs must prove to be as profitable as traditional way of public 
financing (Table 2). A second trend involves adjusting the accounting rules to 
the inner logic of the public-private contract. The extra saving position for 
EPCs in the accounts of Berlin is an example of this. Generally, contracts such 
as EPCs require a huge level of involvement from national and public sector 
accountants, because risk transference (and respective off-government balance 
sheet solutions) depend on a wide array of technical details. As stated before, 
also for classical PPPs, “early consultation with national statistical authorities 
is recommended if the statistical treatment of a project is likely to be a deter-
mining factor in the public sector’s decision to procure” (EPEC et al. 2016, 12). 
An EPC intensifies this direct involvement and alignment of public accountants 
and accounting rules with a microeconomic risk logic. The very fact that exist-
ing PPP regulations have been considered “too strict” (Guidance Note 2017) 
and perceived as a regulative barrier to these new modes of creative public 
financing shows that accountants fluctuate between assuming a position of 
distant macroeconomic objectivity and neutrality, and adopting a more in-
volved role as facilitators of public-private investments.  
Relating these findings to the analytical framework of Alain Desrosières, we 
conclude by distinguishing two conventions of quantification. In the aftermath 
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of the European crisis, accounting reforms have taken the liberal path of 
strengthening official statistics to reestablish market discipline among states, 
and a neoliberal path which allows off-government balance sheet investments – 
often applying complicated and opaque risk sharing models that render mone-
tary flows from the public to the private sector invisible. These solutions also 
reveal the more general idea that private companies are more efficient and 
capable than states to economize. The following table outlines these two very 
different risk concepts:10  
Table 3: Liberal and Neoliberal Public Sector Accounting Conventions 
Convention Liberal Neoliberal 
Market guarantee 
Market discipline guaranteed 
via just and fair public debt 
documentation 
Entrepreneurship, privatization 
Object at risk European financial stability, transparency 
Efficiency of public invest-
ments, economic activity 
Risk object Manipulation Regulative barriers 
Risk practice 
Distant, objective, and impar-
tial expression of public debt 
and deficit levels 
Accountants and accounting 
rules as involved enablers of 
public-private co-financing 
arrangements 
Time horizon Debt and deficit levels in a given moment (present) 
Politics of expectation, imag-
ined futures, risk and return 
models, performance measure-
ment (future) 
Source: Own composition inspired by Desrosières 2003, 2011, and Boholm and Corvellec 2011, 
who distinguish objects at risk from risk objects. 
 
What is interesting to us is the changing risk narrative that underlies this trend. 
Rather than being an actual state of things, risk is something to be debated 
between parties as they express different notions of valuable assets that might 
be endangered. We follow Boholm and Corvellec (2011), who regard “risk as a 
product of situated cognition positing a relationship of risk linking a risk object 
and an object at risk” (ibid., 178). They define a risk object as “something that 
is identified as dangerous” (ibid., 179) that can only be identified in accordance 
with a related object at risk, “something that is held to be of worth, be it life, 
nature, principles, or a state of affairs” (ibid., 180). Risk is a common under-
standing among actors of what is valuable and what might be threatened (e.g., 
                                                             
10  Table 3 leaves out elements of other statistical conventions (the engineer and the Keynesian 
convention), which might be present in the cautionary, impartial, and distant accounting 
attitude applied at the German statistical office (Destatis). There might be elements stem-
ming from a Keynesian statistical convention still vivid in the ESA framework. Moreover, the 
renewed importance of Keynesian statistical perspectives might become evident in the G-20 
Data Gap Initiative to prevent future financial crises and similar attempts to understand 
processes of macroeconomic stability. Although these strands have not been the focus of 
the argument, they are worth mentioning.  
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financial stability or economic growth). The understanding that emerges from 
our case study is that during an ongoing reform process of public sector ac-
counting, risk appears to be re-imagined and re-constructed, constantly. 
Whereas administrators of the liberal state and national and public sector ac-
countants need to determine absolute levels of expenditures to control fiscal 
discipline, the neoliberal state requires accountants to believe in the risk shar-
ing arrangements of the individual contracts to enable creative co-financing 
arrangements. For our argument, it is important to note that the logic of sellable 
risks creates a business case of its own by transforming the notion of absolute 
public expenditures into partitioned future risks sold to a private party. Here, 
the private sector ultimate bears public risks, not the state.11 It is interesting to 
see that within this framework, the seemingly important notion of budgetary 
discipline seems to dissolve; public investments become legitimate again (albe-
it in an opaque manner) and the state relinquishes its external and impartial 
instruments of control. We have also shown that this path is far from linear and 
clear-cut. Accounting practices exist at the local level that stifles these broader 
trends. It is therefore important to understand and study accounting/ financing 
practices on the ground and the multiple ways they change the initial meaning 
of an accounting reform.  
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